When Political Power Is Made Sacred

Denzinger part 56

In Denzinger 1855–1858, taken from Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Diuturnum Illud of June 29, 1881, the Roman Catholic Church presents an extensive theory concerning political authority, the origin of government, popular sovereignty, obedience to rulers, the Reformation, revolutionary movements, and the supposed stabilising influence of the institutional Church upon civil society. The passage contains several statements that are undeniably compatible with Scripture. Human societies require order. Government has a legitimate function. Christians are not commanded to pursue chaos or anarchy. Rulers must administer justice. No earthly authority may command obedience contrary to God. The apostles themselves declared, "We ought to obey God rather than men" in Acts 5:29.

Yet these true propositions are woven into a much larger political theology that goes far beyond what Scripture actually teaches. The question is therefore not whether God is sovereign over earthly rulers. Scripture plainly says that He is. The question is whether Leo XIII has proved the far more specific claims that political rulers derive their actual right to rule directly from God rather than through the consent of the governed; that the people merely select rulers without conferring authority upon them; that social-contract theories are inherently fictitious; that government requires a sacred dignity derived from God in order to possess sufficient authority; that the Reformation caused the revolutionary movements that eventually produced communism, socialism, and nihilism; and that the institutional Roman Church has historically stood above political conflict as the reliable guardian both of princes and peoples.

Those are much greater claims, and they cannot simply be established by quoting Romans 13:1.

The historical setting also matters. Diuturnum Illud was issued in 1881 amid intense European political instability. The encyclical itself begins by lamenting attacks upon rulers, sedition, revolutionary activity, and the murder of a powerful emperor. Leo XIII interprets these developments within a sweeping historical narrative according to which resistance to the "divine authority of the Church" had ultimately endangered civil authority itself. The official text explicitly connects the political disorders of Leo's time with the sixteenth-century Reformation and later developments in modern political philosophy.

That historical anxiety helps explain the document. It does not prove its theology.

Denzinger 1855 begins:

"Although man incited by a kind of arrogance and contumacy often strives to cast off the reins of government, yet he has never been able to succeed in obeying anyone. In every association and community of men, necessity demands that some be in charge."

There is an important truth here. Human communities require some form of organisation, administration, judgment, and authority. Scripture does not glorify chaos. Paul writes:

"Let all things be done decently and in order."—1 Corinthians 14:40

Yet Leo XIII begins by loading the question morally. Man is said to be moved by "arrogance and contumacy" when he seeks to "cast off the reins of government." But Scripture does not teach that resistance to government is inherently the product of arrogance. Sometimes the desire to cast off political rule is wicked rebellion. Sometimes it is a cry against oppression.

The entire book of Exodus begins with an oppressed people groaning beneath political tyranny:

"And the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage."—Exodus 2:23

God did not rebuke Israel for arrogance in wanting Pharaoh's yoke removed. He heard their cry.

"And God heard their groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob."—Exodus 2:24

The ruler in that story possessed enormous political power. Yet his power did not make his oppression sacred. Pharaoh's commands were repeatedly resisted by those who feared God.

The Hebrew midwives directly disobeyed the king:

"But the midwives feared God, and did not as the king of Egypt commanded them, but saved the men children alive."—Exodus 1:17

Scripture commends them rather than condemning them as rebels:

"Therefore God dealt well with the midwives."—Exodus 1:20

The question therefore cannot be reduced to government versus rebellion. The biblical question is always whether authority is acting justly before God.

Leo XIII's statement that every human community requires leadership is broadly reasonable, but it does not establish the rest of his political theory. From the fact that societies require authority, it does not follow that rulers possess a divinely bestowed political right independent of the community that recognises them. That conclusion requires separate proof.

It is also significant that Christ radically transformed the very meaning of authority among His followers. When the disciples argued about greatness, Jesus did not present earthly hierarchy as the model to imitate. He explicitly contrasted His kingdom with the government of the Gentiles:

"Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you."—Matthew 20:25–26

Christ did not abolish every form of leadership, but He refused to sacralise domination. He continued:

"But whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister."—Matthew 20:26

The New Testament therefore does not teach that hierarchy itself possesses sacred majesty. Authority is judged by service, righteousness, truth, and accountability to God.

Does Election Merely Identify the Ruler Without Conferring Authority?

Denzinger 1855 continues:

"Those who are to be in charge of the state can in certain cases be elected by the will and judgment of the multitude, and Catholic doctrine makes no opposition nor resistance. By this election by which the prince is designated, the rights of principality are not conferred, nor is the power committed, but it is determined by whom it is to be carried on."

This is one of the most important assertions in the entire passage. Leo XIII allows that people may elect a ruler, but insists that they do not actually confer authority upon him. They merely identify the person who will exercise a right to rule that originates elsewhere, namely in God.

Where is this precise distinction taught in Scripture?

It is not enough to quote Romans 13 and declare the question settled. Romans 13 says that there is "no power but of God" and that "the powers that be are ordained of God." It does not explain the constitutional mechanism by which one particular individual acquires legitimate political office. It does not say that an electorate merely identifies a ruler but cannot confer governmental authority upon him. That metaphysical distinction is imported into the text rather than extracted from it.

The Old Testament actually contains striking examples in which the people participate directly in making rulers.

First Samuel 11:15 says:

"And all the people went to Gilgal; and there they made Saul king before the LORD in Gilgal."

The text does not say merely that the people discovered which man secretly possessed an independently existing divine right to rule. It says plainly that "they made Saul king."

The words "before the LORD" are especially significant. Popular action and divine sovereignty are not presented as mutually exclusive. The people made Saul king before God.

The same pattern appears with David:

"So all the elders of Israel came to the king to Hebron; and king David made a league with them in Hebron before the LORD: and they anointed David king over Israel."—2 Samuel 5:3

There is a covenant between king and people. The elders participate. The king makes a league with them. They anoint him. All of this occurs "before the LORD."

The biblical pattern is therefore far more nuanced than Leo's simple opposition between divine authority and popular consent.

Deuteronomy 1:13 also records Moses telling the people:

"Take you wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you."

The people participate in identifying their own leaders.

Second Kings 11:17 goes even further:

"And Jehoiada made a covenant between the LORD and the king and the people, that they should be the LORD'S people; between the king also and the people."

There is a covenant not only between God and the nation but "between the king also and the people."

Why should this biblical idea of a covenant between ruler and people be dismissed as incompatible with legitimate authority?

It should not.

Even more devastating to an oversimplified divine-right theory is Hosea 8:4:

"They have set up kings, but not by me: they have made princes, and I knew it not."

This verse immediately demonstrates that the existence of a ruler cannot automatically be equated with divine approval of that ruler's political title.

Yes, God remains sovereign. Nothing occurs outside His knowledge or ultimate providence. Yet Scripture itself distinguishes between God's sovereignty over history and His approval of the particular rulers men establish.

"They have set up kings, but not by me."

Any political theology claiming that every ruler's right to rule is simply received from God must take that verse seriously.

Who Gave the Church Authority to Approve Forms of Government?

Denzinger 1855 continues:

"There is no question here of the kinds of states; for there is no reason why the principality of one person or of several should be approved by the Church, provided it be just and intent upon the common good. Therefore, as long as justice is preserved, peoples are not prohibited from establishing that kind of state for themselves which more aptly befits either their genius or the institutions and customs of their ancestors."

This sounds moderate. Leo XIII does not insist upon monarchy. He permits different political systems.

Yet the deeper question remains: why is the institutional Church speaking as though political systems require its approval?

Where did Christ give the Church universal jurisdiction to approve monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, republics, constitutions, or other forms of civil government?

Christ said:

"My kingdom is not of this world."—John 18:36

When a man asked Jesus to intervene in an inheritance dispute, He replied:

"Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?"—Luke 12:14

Christ certainly taught justice. He condemned oppression, hypocrisy, cruelty, greed, and corruption. Yet He did not establish an ecclesiastical tribunal to approve the constitutional arrangements of the Roman Empire or the nations of the earth.

The apostles did not do so either.

Peter never issued decrees approving particular forms of government. Paul never claimed that the church at Rome possessed authority to decide whether one man or several ought to govern the empire. The Jerusalem council did not debate the legitimate structure of civil states.

The New Testament Church proclaimed Christ.

It preached repentance and remission of sins.

It bore witness to the resurrection.

It called rulers and subjects alike to righteousness.

It did not establish itself as the institution through which governments received theological approval.

Therefore, even where Leo XIII adopts a relatively tolerant position toward different forms of government, his language still assumes something not established by the New Testament: the right of the institutional Church to pronounce authoritatively upon the legitimacy of political constitutions.

Denzinger 1856 states:

"But the Church teaches that what pertains to political power comes from God."

This is the statement that appears, at first sight, to be unquestionably biblical.

Paul writes:

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God."—Romans 13:1

Daniel declares:

"He removeth kings, and setteth up kings."—Daniel 2:21

Jesus told Pilate:

"Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above."—John 19:11

There is therefore an important biblical truth here. God is sovereign over human government. Political authority does not exist outside His providence. Government has a divinely permitted role in restraining evil and administering justice.

Yet none of these verses proves all that Leo XIII builds upon them.

To say that God is the ultimate sovereign over political authority is not the same as saying that a particular ruler's constitutional right to rule cannot derive from the consent of the governed.

These propositions are not mutually exclusive.

God may ordain the existence of civil government while human beings establish the constitutional method by which governors are appointed.

God may be the ultimate source of moral authority while the people confer specific governmental office upon elected representatives.

God may permit governments to exist while condemning the particular rulers who seize or abuse power.

Indeed, later Roman Catholic teaching itself has recognised the need for this distinction. In Pacem in Terris in 1963, John XXIII quoted John Chrysostom explaining Romans 13 in precisely this manner: "Is every ruler appointed by God? No, that is not what I mean," but rather that the existence of ruling authority itself is a provision of divine wisdom. The same encyclical explicitly stated that the fact that authority comes from God does not prevent people from choosing rulers, deciding their form of government, and determining the procedures and limitations under which rulers exercise power.

That clarification is extremely important.

It means that even within later Roman Catholic political thought, "authority comes from God" cannot legitimately be turned into the simplistic proposition that every particular ruler has been personally installed by God or possesses an indefeasible sacred title to rule.

Romans 13 itself describes what a legitimate ruler is supposed to do:

"For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil."—Romans 13:3

Again:

"For he is the minister of God to thee for good."—Romans 13:4

The ruler is God's servant "for good."

What happens when the ruler becomes a terror to good works and a protector of evil?

Scripture gives abundant examples.

Pharaoh murdered children.

Ahab stole Naboth's vineyard and murdered him.

Nebuchadnezzar demanded idolatrous worship.

Darius was manipulated into prohibiting prayer.

Herod murdered John the Baptist.

Another Herod killed James and imprisoned Peter.

The Roman authorities crucified Christ.

Government is therefore not sacred merely because it governs.

The prophets did not tell wicked kings, "You rule, therefore resistance to you is resistance to God."

Nathan rebuked David.

Elijah confronted Ahab.

Micaiah opposed four hundred flattering prophets and contradicted the king.

John the Baptist told Herod:

"It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife."—Mark 6:18

Political power is subordinate to divine judgment. It is never identical with divine righteousness.

Pilate Had Power from Above, but That Did Not Make His Judgment Just

Leo XIII appeals in the full encyclical to Christ's words to Pilate:

"Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above."—John 19:11

Yet this verse actually illustrates the danger of confusing divine sovereignty with divine approval.

Pilate's power existed under God's providence. Nevertheless, Pilate condemned the innocent Son of God.

God's sovereignty over an event does not transform evil into justice.

The crucifixion itself occurred according to God's foreknowledge, yet Acts 2:23 still calls those who crucified Christ wicked:

"Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain."

The same event can therefore be under divine sovereignty and simultaneously carried out by wicked human authorities.

This distinction is essential.

Otherwise, every tyranny could defend itself by saying that because God is sovereign and the government exists, its authority must possess divine legitimacy.

Scripture allows no such conclusion.

The Biblical Problem for a Simplistic Divine-Right Doctrine

Hosea 8:4 must be faced directly:

"They have set up kings, but not by me: they have made princes, and I knew it not."

How can Leo XIII's position be maintained without qualification in light of this verse?

The answer cannot simply be that God was sovereign over these rulers in a general providential sense. Of course He was. The verse nevertheless makes an explicit distinction between rulers whom men established and rulers whom God approved.

"They have set up kings."

"But not by me."

Therefore, Scripture itself refuses to identify the mere possession of political office with divine appointment in the morally legitimising sense that Leo's argument requires.

Revelation provides an even more alarming picture. Political power can become beastly.

Revelation 13:2 says:

"And the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority."

The point is not that Satan can overturn God's ultimate sovereignty. He cannot. The point is that Scripture does not sentimentalise political power. The state may serve justice, as in Romans 13, or become persecuting and beastlike, as in Revelation 13.

Any complete Christian theology of political authority must contain both chapters.

Romans 13 without Revelation 13 can become a theology of submission to tyranny.

Revelation 13 without Romans 13 can become a theology of anarchy.

Scripture gives us both because political power can function either as a servant restraining evil or as a beast making war against the saints.

Denzinger 1856 continues:

"It is a great error not to see what is manifest, that, although men are not solitaries, it is not by congenital free will that they are impelled to a natural community life; and moreover the pact which they proclaim is patently feigned and fictitious, and cannot bestow as much force, dignity, and strength to the political power as the protection of the state and the common welfare of the citizens require."

This statement deserves especially close scrutiny because Leo moves from theology into political philosophy and simply pronounces the opposing position fictitious.

Certainly, no one chooses to be born into human society. Man is social by nature. Every human being begins life dependent upon others. Families, languages, communities, customs, and social relationships exist before any individual exercises mature political choice.

But this does not prove that political consent is fictitious.

It merely proves that society and government are not exactly the same thing.

Human beings naturally form families and communities. That does not prove that a particular king, emperor, president, parliament, or regime possesses authority independently of popular consent.

Leo's argument moves too quickly from the natural social character of man to a specific doctrine of political legitimacy.

Scripture itself contains covenants, agreements, public assemblies, consultations, and mutual obligations between rulers and peoples. As already seen, David "made a league" with Israel's elders before they anointed him king. Second Kings speaks explicitly of a covenant "between the king also and the people."

Why is a covenant between ruler and people biblical, while political authority arising through public consent must be dismissed as a fiction?

No scriptural argument is supplied.

The historical argument is equally problematic. Social-contract reasoning cannot simply be dismissed as a novelty generated by the Reformation. Ideas resembling social-contract arguments appeared in political philosophy long before the sixteenth century, and the modern social-contract tradition itself contains profoundly different conclusions. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that a form of social-contract reasoning appears as early as Plato's Crito, while the modern tradition later developed through Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

Even more damaging to Leo's generalisation is Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes used social-contract reasoning not to weaken sovereign authority but to defend an absolute, undivided, extremely powerful sovereign. Stanford's account of Hobbes explicitly notes that his social-contract method led him to argue for submission to an absolute sovereign power.

Therefore, the claim that grounding political authority in public consent necessarily destroys governmental strength is historically false as a general proposition.

One may agree or disagree with Hobbes. That is not the point.

The point is that social-contract theories do not all lead to weak government, rebellion, or the destruction of political authority. Leo treats a vast and varied political tradition as though it inevitably leads to one conclusion. It does not.

More fundamentally, the choice between "authority from God" and "authority through the people" is a false dilemma.

A Christian may believe that God has ordained civil government for the restraint of evil while simultaneously believing that a particular ruler acquires legitimate office through the consent of the governed.

There is no contradiction.

The moral order may ultimately come from God while constitutional authority is exercised through human institutions.

The Bible never says otherwise.

Does Government Need Sacred Majesty in Order to Survive?

Denzinger 1856 concludes:

"But the principality is to possess these universal glories and aids, only if it is understood that they come from God, the august and most holy source."

This claim is asserted rather than demonstrated.

Why must political authority possess "glories" arising from a sacred source in order to function effectively?

A government may possess legitimate authority because its laws are just, because its constitution is recognised, because its representatives have been lawfully chosen, because its citizens have consented to its institutions, and because it protects innocent people from violence and fraud.

None of this requires rulers to be surrounded with sacred majesty.

Indeed, Scripture repeatedly warns against the exaltation of human rulers.

Samuel's warning concerning monarchy in 1 Samuel 8 is especially relevant. Israel demanded a king "like all the nations." Samuel warned what such a ruler might do:

"He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen."

Again:

"And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers."

Again:

"And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them."

Finally:

"And ye shall be his servants."—1 Samuel 8:11–17

The biblical instinct is not to surround political power with increasing sacred splendour. It is to warn humanity what unchecked rulers may do.

When authority is treated as sacred, criticism can easily be treated as impiety.

When rulers are presented as bearers of divine majesty, political resistance can be condemned as rebellion against God.

When the state and religious institution mutually reinforce one another's authority, both can become harder to challenge.

The prophets took the opposite path. They stripped rulers of pretended glory and summoned them before the judgment of God.

Isaiah did not flatter princes.

Jeremiah did not sanctify royal propaganda.

Elijah did not tell Ahab that criticism would cut the nerves of political power.

John the Baptist did not protect Herod's dignity.

Christ called Herod "that fox" in Luke 13:32.

The biblical tradition does not depend upon making earthly rulers glorious. It depends upon making them accountable.

Is There Only One Reason for Disobeying Government?

Denzinger 1857 declares:

"That is the one reason for men not obeying, if something is demanded of them which is openly at odds with natural and divine law; for it is equally wrong to order and to do anything in which the law of nature or the will of God is violated."

There is a substantial biblical truth here. Christians must never obey human commands that require sin.

The Hebrew midwives disobeyed Pharaoh.

Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego refused Nebuchadnezzar's command to worship the golden image.

Daniel continued praying despite the royal decree.

The apostles continued preaching Christ after being commanded to stop.

Acts 5:29 gives the decisive principle:

"We ought to obey God rather than men."

Yet Leo's wording is remarkably absolute: "That is the one reason for men not obeying."

If "natural and divine law" is defined so broadly that it encompasses every injustice, abuse, illegitimate act, unconstitutional command, violation of legitimate rights, and misuse of office, then the statement becomes extremely expansive.

But if it is understood narrowly to mean that disobedience is permitted only when the state directly commands a person to commit an unmistakable sin, Scripture gives a more complex picture.

Paul did not merely obey every command until ordered personally to sin. He challenged unlawful treatment.

After Paul and Silas had been beaten and imprisoned unlawfully, the magistrates later tried to release them privately. Paul refused:

"They have beaten us openly uncondemned, being Romans, and have cast us into prison; and now do they thrust us out privily? nay verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out."—Acts 16:37

Paul challenged authority.

He exposed its unlawful conduct.

He demanded public accountability.

In Acts 22, when Paul was about to be scourged, he asserted his legal rights:

"Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman, and uncondemned?"—Acts 22:25

In Acts 25, Paul appealed over the heads of local authorities:

"I appeal unto Caesar."—Acts 25:11

Scripture therefore does not present submission as mindless passivity.

Jesus Himself challenged the servant who struck Him:

"If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me?"—John 18:23

That is not rebellion, but neither is it silent acquiescence.

The apostles used legal rights, challenged unlawful treatment, escaped persecution, appealed decisions, fled from violent rulers, and refused commands contrary to God.

The Christian is called to peace, but peace is not servility.

The Christian is called to honour legitimate authority, but honour is not worship.

The Christian is called to submission, but submission is not the surrender of conscience, truth, justice, or lawful resistance to abuse.

"Render unto Caesar" Is a Limitation of Caesar, Not a Blank Cheque

Denzinger 1857 quotes Christ:

"The things that are Caesar's, to Caesar; the things that are God's to God."

This text certainly rejects anarchy. Caesar has legitimate claims.

But the verse simultaneously establishes a boundary around Caesar.

Some things belong to Caesar.

Other things belong to God.

Caesar does not own everything.

The state does not own the conscience.

The state does not define truth.

The state does not possess the soul.

The state cannot command worship.

The state cannot replace God.

The sentence is therefore just as much a restriction upon political power as a command to obey it.

The apostles understood this clearly:

"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye."—Acts 4:19

Again:

"We ought to obey God rather than men."—Acts 5:29

These words were not spoken to pagan emperors but to religious authorities. That is equally important. Acts 5:29 is not merely a weapon against the secular state. It establishes the supremacy of obedience to God over every human institution, whether civil or religious.

A pope can be disobeyed when he contradicts God.

A council can be rejected when it contradicts God.

A priest can be resisted when he contradicts God.

A king can be refused when he contradicts God.

A parliament can be opposed when it contradicts God.

The principle belongs to God, not to the institutional Church.

Denzinger 1857 continues:

"To be unwilling to refer the right of ordering to God, the author, is nothing else than to wish the most beautiful splendor of political power destroyed, and its nerves cut."

This is powerful rhetoric, but it is not biblical exegesis.

Why must political power possess "splendor"?

Why should the dignity of government depend upon the belief that the ruler's right to command is directly bestowed by God rather than constitutionally conferred through the people?

The New Testament does not explain civil authority in terms of political splendour. Romans 13 calls the ruler God's "minister" or servant.

The Greek word diakonos is the ordinary word for a servant or minister.

The ruler is not God.

The ruler is not infallible.

The ruler does not possess spiritual supremacy.

The ruler is a servant charged with doing good.

"For he is the minister of God to thee for good."

The qualification matters.

Political authority is functional and accountable. It exists for good.

The danger begins when political power is clothed in sacred splendour and people are told that their obedience to a ruler is effectively obedience to God Himself.

Leo's full encyclical goes remarkably far in this direction, stating that citizens should perceive rulers as bearing a certain divine dignity and even speaking of obedience to rulers "as to God." It also declares that those who refuse honour to rulers refuse it to God Himself.

Such language must be treated with extreme caution.

The prophets refused to confuse God with His appointed rulers.

Saul was anointed, yet Samuel rebuked him and declared his kingdom rejected.

David was chosen, yet Nathan confronted him with the words:

"Thou art the man."—2 Samuel 12:7

Ahab was king, yet Elijah stood before him and condemned his wickedness.

Political authority never transforms a sinful man into an image before whom the conscience must bow.

The believer's conscience belongs to God.

The Reformation Blamed for Rebellion

Denzinger 1857 then makes a sweeping historical assertion:

"In fact, sudden tumults and most daring rebellions, especially in Germany, have followed that so-called Reformation, whose supporters and leaders have utterly opposed sacred and civil power with new doctrines."

This statement contains a partial historical truth but transforms it into an enormous generalisation.

The German Peasants' War of 1524–1525 did occur shortly after the beginning of the Reformation, and religious ideas associated with radical reformers played a role in the revolt. It would be historically dishonest to deny any connection whatsoever.

But Leo XIII goes far beyond that modest claim.

He presents the Reformation's leaders collectively as men whose doctrines attacked sacred and civil authority at the foundation.

That simply cannot be sustained as a general historical statement.

Martin Luther himself condemned the Peasants' Revolt and sided with the civil rulers against it. Whatever one thinks of Luther's brutal language or the justice of his position, his condemnation of the rebellion is historical evidence that the "supporters and leaders" of the Reformation cannot simply be described as collectively opposing civil authority. A historical account from the Online Library of Liberty likewise notes that although the peasants drew upon ideas of freedom associated with Luther, Luther denounced their uprising.

More importantly, popular rebellion did not suddenly appear in Europe after 1517.

The English Peasants' Revolt occurred in 1381, more than a century before Luther's Ninety-five Theses. It arose from social, economic, and political grievances in medieval Catholic England.

Europe had witnessed rebellions, dynastic wars, noble uprisings, popular revolts, urban conflicts, peasant resistance, and bloody political struggles throughout the medieval period.

Therefore, rebellion cannot be historically explained as a product of the Reformation.

It existed before the Reformation.

It existed in Catholic societies.

It existed under popes, bishops, emperors, and kings.

It arose from religious, political, economic, dynastic, regional, social, and personal causes.

Leo's historical narrative is too convenient. Opposition to Roman ecclesiastical authority becomes the beginning of a chain leading from Reformation to rebellion, from rebellion to philosophy, from philosophy to popular sovereignty, and from popular sovereignty ultimately to communism, socialism, and nihilism.

This is not careful history.

It is a theological genealogy of blame.

Did the Reformation Produce Communism, Socialism, and Nihilism?

Leo XIII writes:

"From that heresy a falsely called philosophy took its origin in an earlier time, and a right, which they call 'new,' and a popular power, and an ignorant license which many people consider only liberty. From these we have come to the ultimate plagues, namely, to communism, to socialism, to nihilism, most loathsome monsters and almost destroyers of man's civil society."

This is perhaps the most historically sweeping claim in the entire passage.

The Reformation becomes the ancestor of modern philosophy.

Modern philosophy produces theories of popular sovereignty.

Popular sovereignty produces licence.

Licence produces communism, socialism, and nihilism.

The argument is extraordinarily compressed.

It is also historically inadequate.

Socialism itself is not one single doctrine. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes it as a broad tradition containing numerous theories and sharply differing positions.

Marx's thought arose from a complex intellectual environment involving German philosophy, political economy, French socialist currents, industrial capitalism, class conflict, and his critical engagement with Hegel and other thinkers. To reduce this complex genealogy to a remote consequence of the sixteenth-century Reformation is polemical rather than demonstrative.

The same applies to nihilism. The Russian nihilist movement of the nineteenth century emerged within its own particular philosophical, cultural, political, and social circumstances.

It cannot responsibly be explained by drawing a straight line from Luther in 1517 to nihilism three centuries later.

Nor can every appeal to popular sovereignty be equated with communism.

Nor can political liberty be equated with moral licence.

Nor can rejection of papal political authority be equated with rejection of all civil authority.

These are separate questions.

Leo repeatedly collapses distinctions that must be preserved.

A person can reject papal supremacy while affirming civil law.

A person can believe in democratic government while rejecting communism.

A person can believe political authority is delegated by the people while believing all human beings remain morally accountable to God.

A person can affirm religious liberty without embracing nihilism.

A person can reject a divine-right monarchy without rejecting divine sovereignty.

A person can oppose tyranny without opposing order.

The encyclical gives the impression that once mankind denies the Roman Church's conception of authority, the road eventually ends in social chaos.

History does not permit such simplicity.

Neither does Scripture.

Christ Never Taught That Political Liberty Depends Upon Submission to an Ecclesiastical Institution

The greatest theological problem is that the argument repeatedly moves from God to the institutional Church as though the two authorities were inseparable.

The document begins with the supposed war against "the divine authority of the Church." It then argues for the sacred origin of civil authority and finally presents the Church as the great historical defender of rulers, peoples, justice, order, and civilisation.

But Scripture never says that political order depends upon submission to Rome.

Paul did not write:

Let every soul be subject to the Roman Church so that the Roman Church may teach rulers how to govern.

He wrote:

"For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."—1 Timothy 2:5

The New Testament directs believers to Christ.

Christ is Head of the body.

Christ is King.

Christ is Lord.

Christ possesses all authority in heaven and earth.

Christ gives the Spirit.

Christ intercedes.

Christ judges.

Christ saves.

The apostles never taught that the Bishop of Rome would become the doctrinal guardian of civil authority for every nation.

That is not explicitly taught.

It is not necessarily implied.

It is historically developed.

Can the Church Really Claim That Princes and Peoples Have Nothing to Fear from Her?

Denzinger 1858 states:

"Surely the Church of Christ cannot be mistrusted by the princes nor hated by the people. Indeed, she advises the princes to follow justice and in nothing to err from duty; and at the same time she strengthens and aids their authority in many ways."

This is not merely theology. It is the institutional Church describing itself.

That alone demands scrutiny.

The Church declares that princes cannot reasonably mistrust her and that peoples should not hate her because she supports justice while strengthening legitimate authority.

Yet no institution should be allowed to establish its own innocence merely by declaring itself innocent.

Christ said:

"By their fruits ye shall know them."—Matthew 7:20

The test is not what an institution says about itself.

The test is its fruit.

The question is therefore not whether Roman Catholic documents profess justice. The question is whether the historical exercise of ecclesiastical power consistently conformed to Christ and the apostles.

Did Christ possess armies?

Did Peter rule a territory as a temporal prince?

Did Paul establish ecclesiastical courts with political coercive power over unbelievers?

Did the apostles negotiate concordats with emperors?

Did they command governments to suppress religious dissent?

Did they crown kings?

Did they claim jurisdiction over the political arrangements of nations?

Did they declare that resistance to their ecclesiastical authority endangered civilisation itself?

The answer is no.

The New Testament Church possessed no earthly sword.

Paul wrote:

"For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal."—2 Corinthians 10:4

Jesus told Pilate:

"My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight."—John 18:36

That sentence alone should remain permanently before every church that seeks political power.

"If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight."

Christ's kingdom advances through truth, witness, suffering, the preaching of the gospel, the power of the Holy Ghost, repentance, faith, and the new birth.

It does not require sacred princes to protect its authority.

The Claim That the Church Strengthens Rulers Requires an Immediate Question: Which Rulers?

Leo says that the Church "strengthens and aids their authority in many ways."

But which authority?

A just ruler?

A tyrant?

A persecutor?

An emperor?

A hereditary king?

A democratically elected parliament?

A ruler who protects religious liberty?

A ruler who suppresses dissent?

Scripture never commands the Church to strengthen political authority indiscriminately.

The prophet's task was often precisely the opposite.

Elijah did not strengthen Ahab's authority. He exposed him.

Nathan did not protect David from criticism. He confronted him.

John the Baptist did not safeguard Herod's public standing. He condemned his sin.

Christ did not flatter Pilate.

Paul did not remain silent when Roman officials violated his rights.

The Church's duty is not to strengthen princes.

Its duty is to bear witness to truth.

Sometimes truth will affirm a ruler.

Sometimes truth will condemn him.

Sometimes truth will require obedience.

Sometimes truth will require the words:

"We ought to obey God rather than men."

The Church loses its prophetic character when preserving authority becomes more important than proclaiming truth.

Denzinger 1858 continues:

"Whatever takes place in the field of civil affairs, she recognizes and declares to be in their power and supreme control."

Again, this appears at first to be a simple distinction between church and state.

Yet the word "supreme" requires caution.

No earthly ruler possesses genuinely supreme control in the absolute sense.

God alone is supreme.

Human authority is limited.

The king is under God's law.

The magistrate is accountable to justice.

The state cannot own the conscience.

The ruler cannot define good and evil by decree.

A civil authority may call murder legal, but it remains evil before God.

A government may forbid the preaching of Christ, but the command does not bind the apostle.

A king may order worship of an image, but the faithful must refuse.

A ruler may forbid prayer, but Daniel opens his window.

Therefore, Caesar has a sphere, but Caesar is never supreme in the ultimate sense.

Christ is supreme.

The biblical hierarchy is never Pope and emperor standing above mankind in two coordinated jurisdictions.

It is Christ above all.

Paul writes:

"And he is before all things, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the church."—Colossians 1:17–18

Again:

"That in all things he might have the preeminence."—Colossians 1:18

The preeminence belongs to Christ.

Denzinger 1858 continues:

"In those matters whose judgment, although for different reasons, pertains to sacred and civil power, she wishes that there exist concord between both, by benefit of which lamentable contentions are avoided for both."

Peace between religious and civil authorities may certainly be desirable.

Paul writes:

"If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men."—Romans 12:18

Yet the New Testament does not teach a theory of two great institutional powers, Church and State, existing in mutual concord and dividing jurisdiction over mankind.

The earliest Christians did not possess such concord.

They were persecuted.

The apostles were imprisoned.

Stephen was stoned.

James was killed.

Peter was jailed.

Paul was repeatedly beaten.

John was exiled.

The Church did not lose its legitimacy because Caesar refused concord.

Quite the opposite.

It often displayed its greatest faithfulness precisely by refusing compromise with earthly power.

Revelation does not present the union of religious and political power as automatically desirable. It gives terrifying images of religious deception cooperating with persecuting political authority.

Therefore, "concord" is not inherently righteous.

The question is always concord around what?

Truth?

Justice?

Liberty of conscience?

The protection of the innocent?

Or mutual protection of institutional power?

A peaceful alliance between Church and State can be good when both respect justice.

It can also become extremely dangerous when religious authority sanctifies rulers and rulers enforce religious authority.

The New Testament never commands such a union.

The Church's Self-Portrait Must Be Tested by Christ, Not Accepted by Decree

The deepest problem with the final section is its idealised self-description.

Leo presents the Church as the friend of princes, mother of peoples, defender of justice, enemy of tyranny, guardian of liberty, mediator in conflict, and stabilising force of civilisation.

But a church cannot establish these claims merely by saying them.

Christ gave the test:

"By their fruits ye shall know them."

And Paul gave another:

"Prove all things; hold fast that which is good."—1 Thessalonians 5:21

The Roman Church must therefore be tested exactly as every other human institution must be tested.

Not by its titles.

Not by its claims of indefectibility.

Not by papal assertions concerning its own historical benevolence.

Not by appeals to antiquity.

Not by the prestige of princes.

Not by political influence.

But by Christ.

By the apostles.

By Scripture.

By truth.

The question is never whether an institution calls itself the Church of Christ.

The question is whether its doctrines and actions conform to Christ.

The centre of Leo XIII's scriptural case is Romans 13. Therefore Romans 13 must be read carefully rather than used as an ecclesiastical slogan.

Paul writes:

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God."

But he immediately describes the purpose of rulers:

"For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil."

Again:

"For he is the minister of God to thee for good."

Again:

"For he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."

The ruler is defined functionally.

He restrains evil.

He protects good.

He administers justice.

He is a servant.

Nothing in Romans 13 says that a ruler obtains office independently of the people's consent.

Nothing says that elections merely identify the person in whom a pre-existing divine right mysteriously resides.

Nothing condemns constitutional government.

Nothing condemns popular sovereignty.

Nothing condemns the social contract.

Nothing grants the Bishop of Rome authority to approve political systems.

Nothing says political power requires sacred splendour.

Nothing traces communism to the Reformation.

Nothing establishes the Roman Church as the historical guardian of princes and peoples.

Those claims are not found in Romans 13.

They are additions to Romans 13.

The Full Biblical Picture: Romans 13, Hosea 8, 1 Samuel 8, Acts 5, and Revelation 13

A sound biblical doctrine of government must hold several truths together.

Romans 13 teaches that civil authority has a legitimate God-permitted function and should be obeyed in its proper sphere.

Hosea 8 warns that men may establish rulers whom God does not approve:

"They have set up kings, but not by me."

First Samuel 8 warns that rulers may take sons, daughters, fields, vineyards, servants, and wealth until the people themselves become servants.

Acts 5 establishes the absolute supremacy of obedience to God:

"We ought to obey God rather than men."

Revelation 13 warns that political authority can become beastly, blasphemous, idolatrous, and persecuting.

No single verse should erase the others.

Government is not inherently evil.

Government is not inherently holy.

Authority is not an idol.

Liberty is not inherently licence.

Resistance is not inherently rebellion against God.

Submission is not absolute.

The conscience belongs to God.

Christ alone is Lord.

True Premises Are Used to Carry Unproved Conclusions

The most effective way to understand this passage is to notice how repeatedly it begins with something true and then moves beyond it.

Human beings require social order. True.

Therefore, rulers possess authority independently of popular consent. Not proved.

God is sovereign over political authority. True.

Therefore, the people merely identify rulers but cannot confer political authority. Not proved.

Christians should ordinarily obey lawful government. True.

Therefore, there is only one legitimate ground for disobedience, narrowly understood. Not proved.

Social disorder is dangerous. True.

Therefore, political power needs sacred majesty to remain strong. Not proved.

The German Reformation was followed by serious upheaval. True.

Therefore, the Reformation was the theological ancestor of communism, socialism, and nihilism. Not proved.

Churches should encourage justice and peace. True.

Therefore, the Roman Church cannot reasonably be mistrusted by princes or hated by peoples. Not proved.

Church and state may sometimes cooperate for good. True.

Therefore, the institutional Church possesses divinely established jurisdiction to determine the boundaries between sacred and civil power. Not proved.

This is the central problem.

The text repeatedly places an ecclesiastical conclusion behind a biblical premise and treats the conclusion as though Scripture had established both.

It has not.

The New Testament Does Not Lead to Sacred Princes and Ecclesiastical Political Guardianship

When the New Testament speaks of power, its centre is Christ.

Jesus declared:

"All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth."—Matthew 28:18

Paul wrote of Christ:

"Who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him."—1 Peter 3:22

Christ is King of kings.

Christ is Lord of lords.

Christ does not require a pope to make His authority effective.

He does not require a sacred emperor to give His gospel dignity.

He does not require an ecclesiastical-political alliance to preserve His kingdom.

His apostles conquered without earthly thrones.

They preached without armies.

They endured persecution without crowning kings.

They appealed to conscience without coercing it.

They rebuked rulers without claiming temporal sovereignty.

They established churches without establishing a Christian empire.

They proclaimed one Lord:

Jesus Christ.

Conclusion

Denzinger 1855–1858 contains some genuine biblical principles. Government has a legitimate purpose. Society requires order. Rulers should pursue justice and the common good. Christians should not glorify chaos or violence. Human commands must never take precedence over God's will. Acts 5:29 remains absolute:

"We ought to obey God rather than men."

But these truths do not establish Leo XIII's wider political system.

Scripture does not teach that popular consent is incapable of conferring political office.

It does not teach that an electorate merely identifies the ruler while the ruler's actual political right descends independently from God.

It does not dismiss every social-contract theory as fictitious.

It does not say that political authority requires sacred splendour.

It does not teach that resistance to rulers is necessarily arrogance.

It does not teach that the Reformation produced communism, socialism, and nihilism.

It does not grant the institutional Roman Church authority to approve constitutional systems.

It does not establish a permanent partnership between ecclesiastical and civil rulers.

It does not command humanity to regard earthly princes as possessors of a sacred majesty that must be strengthened by religious authority.

Above all, Romans 13 must never be isolated from Hosea 8:4, where God says, "They have set up kings, but not by me"; from 1 Samuel 8, where God warns what kings may take from their subjects; from Acts 5:29, where the apostles place obedience to God above every human authority; and from Revelation 13, where political power itself becomes a persecuting beast.

The biblical doctrine is both more balanced and more radical than Leo XIII's.

God is sovereign.

Rulers are accountable.

Authority is limited.

Justice matters.

Conscience belongs to God.

The people are not the property of princes.

The Church is not the master of nations.

No pope is Caesar's divine guarantor.

No ruler bears an authority that places him beyond scrutiny.

No human institution may stand between the believer and the command of God.

The Christian honours lawful authority, but worships none but God. The Christian seeks peace, but will not purchase peace with disobedience to Christ. The Christian respects rulers, but remembers that rulers are dust. The Christian submits where submission is right, resists where obedience would betray God, and tests every claim of sacred authority against the words of Christ and His apostles.

For there remains only one King whose authority is absolute, only one Lord before whom every knee shall bow, and only one name above every name.

That King is not the emperor.

That Lord is not the pope.

That name is Jesus Christ.